II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF WILSON
On July 4, 1970, Joseph Wilson and two accomplices fatally shot a night dispatcher while robbing a New York City taxicab garage. 17 Wilson surrendered himself to authorities four days after committing the offenses. s Although witnesses testified that Wilson was at the garage before the crime 1 9 and observed him fleeing with money soon after the robbery, Wilson denied any involvement. 20 Wilson did admit to witnessing the robbery and gave the police a description of the perpetrators. 2 1 He claimed, however, that he did not know their identities. 22 Wilson also asserted that he fled from the scene to avoid being held responsible for crimes he did not commit. 2 3 After his arraignment, Wilson was placed in a cell with another prisoner, Benny Lee. 24 The window in the cellblock overlooked the Star Taxicab Garage, the scene of Wilson's criminal offenses. 2 5 Unbeknownst to Wilson See id. at 2619 n.1. 30 Wilson's brother related to Wilson that family members were distressed because they believed Wilson murdered the garage employee. Id. at 2619. sions to Lee. 3 ' Wilson admitted to Lee that he had participated in the robbery and in the shooting. 32 Lee then informed Detective Cullen of Wilson's statements. 3 3 Before the trial began, Wilson unsuccessfully moved to suppress the statements made to Lee on the ground that they were obtained in violation of Wilson's sixth amendment right to counsel. 34 The trial court found that the informant had been carefully instructed not to ask any questions of Wilson concerning the crime, had carefully followed this advice, and, therefore, had only listened to Wilson's confessions. 35 The trial court ruled that the statements were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited" and, thus, admissible under New York law. 3 6 A New York jury found Wilson guilty of common law murder and felonious possession of a weapon. 37 The appellate division affirmed the conviction. 3 8 The New York Court of Appeals denied Wilson leave to appeal. Wilson subsequently filed a federal petition for habeas corpus relief. 40 He reasserted that admission of the incriminating statements into evidence violated his sixth amendment right to counsel. 4 1 The district court denied the writ 4 2 and a divided court of appeals affirmed the denial. 4 3 The Supreme Court later refused a 31 Id. at 2619-20. 32 Id. at 2620.
33
Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. In determining the admissibility of Wilson's statements and the nature of the informant's role in inducing such statements, the trial court heard the testimony of Lee and Detective Cullen but not Wilson 42 Id. The district court applied the Massiah standards to the trial court record and concluded that Wilson's statements were "spontaneous" rather than responses to state interrogation. Id. 43 See Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978 . The court of appeals determined that a sixth amendment violation occurs if authorities make a deliberate effort to elicit incriminating statements from a criminal suspect after indictment of the suspect and in the absence of legal counsel. Id. at 1189 (relying on the standard created in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) ). The court of appeals required "some circumstance more than the mere absence of counsel before a defendant's postindictment statement is rendered inadmissable." Wilson, 584 F.2d at 1190. The court of appeals found no such circumstance in Wilson's case. Id. at 1190-91 (stressing that the trial judge's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
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petition for writ of certiorari. 4 4 After the United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Henry, 4 5 Wilson, believing that Henry constituted a new rule of law that should be retroactively applied to his case, filed a motion to vacate his conviction in the state trial court. 4 6 The court denied the motion. 47 Wilson then returned to the federal district court with a second federal habeas corpus petition. 48 The district court found that this case did not present the "passive informant" issue left open in Henry. 4 9 Because Lee had made no "affirmative effort" to induce the incriminating statements, the court held that Wilson's right to counsel was not violated. 50 In overruling the lower court's judgment, a divided court of appeals found the crucial elements in Henry and Wilson to be indistinguishable. 51 The court of appeals directed the district court to hold a new trial for Wilson or order his release. 52 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues. First, the Court contemplated whether justice required consideration of Wilson's second petition of habeas 44 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2620. 45 447 U.S. 264 (1980) . 46 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621. Wilson presumably noted that the Henry decision was the first Supreme Court case to apply the "deliberately elicited" standard to jailhouse informant practices and that the facts of the two cases were similar. 47 Id. Wilson, 742 F.2d at 743. Second, since the court of appeals believed that the two cases were indistinguishable, the appellate court did not reach the "passive informant" question. Id. at 745. The court also decided that a retroactive application of Henry was appropriate since Henry involved the application of settled principles rather than the creation of a new constitutional rule. Id. at 746-47.
In dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland argued that Wilson had failed to demonstrate by convincing evidence that the initial findings of the state trial court were erroneous. Judge Van Graafeiland also scorned the majority for finding that a successive review of Wilson's habeas corpus petition would serve the "ends ofjustice" without properly supporting that conclusion. Id. at 749-50 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). 52 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 748.
corpus. 5 3 Second, the Court considered whether the appellate court correctly applied Henry and its progeny to the facts of this case. Although the right to counsel has now permeated many aspects of criminal investigations and prosecutions, 5 7 the Henry line of decisions is concerned primarily with the postindictment efforts of state agents to surreptitiously induce incriminating statements from criminal defendants. The Henry line of decisions, however, actually has its underpinnings in Spano v. New York, 58 a decision that involved a coerced confession.
Police detectives in Spano employed lengthy interrogation and other unseemly police tactics to persuade Spano to confess to a murder. 59 The Supreme Court barred the admission of Spano's confession, ruling that the tactics employed by the detectives and the denial of Spano's attempts to interpose his attorney in the interrogation violated the defendant's right to counsel. 60 The concurring opinions stressed the importance of adequate protection at all 53 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621. 54 Id. at 2621-22. 55 287 U.S. 45 (1932) . The Court held that the defendant in a capital offense crime has the right to have adequate time to meet with counsel and to prepare a defense. Id. at 68-71. The Court found that the right to have sufficient time to confer with counsel exists from the earliest stage of prosecution. The Powell Court termed this early investigation and preparation as "vitally important" and an entitlement of each defendant. Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
56 See infra note 57. 57 For example, the Court has ruled that an individual has the right to counsel while in state custody. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that any individual in custody must be informed of certain rights including the right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present during questioning and the right to a court-appointed attorney if the individual cannot afford one). The Court has established the right to appointed counsel at all felony trials. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that any defendant in a criminal trial who is unable to afford legal representation cannot be assured a proper trial unless legal counsel is provided by the state). The right to counsel was extended by the Court to any preliminary hearing where a suspect enters a plea. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)(holding that the presence of counsel is necessary to enable the accused to plead intelligently and with a full understanding of all available defenses).
58 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 59 Id. at 317-20. The interrogation lasted all night and into the early morning hours, totalling close to eight hours of nearly continuous questioning. The police also employed a friend of the defendant's in the interrogation. The friend falsely maintained to Spano that he, the friend, would be in trouble if Spano did not confess. Id. at 319. 60 Id. at 322-24. The Court in a strongly critical opinion warned: [Vol. 77
stages of prosecution and found that the denial of this protection by the police was sufficient grounds for reversal.
The first Supreme Court attempt to develop a standard for scrutinizing surreptitious police practices in a right to counsel context came in the 1964 opinion of Massiah v. United States. 62 In Massiah, the defendant and an accomplice were indicted on federal narcotics law charges and were subsequently released on bail pending trial. 63 Massiah's cohort, Colson, agreed to assist the government in its continuing investigation of Massiah. 64 Colson led Massiah into making several incriminating statements that were subsequently used against him at trial. 6 5 Relying heavily on the language of the Spano concurring opinions, the Court held:
[T]he petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee [of the sixth amendment right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.
6 6
In the first right to counsel decision to involve the use of a jailhouse informant, 6 7 the Court in United States v. Heny 68 applied and
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves. Id. at 320-21. 61 The informant was compensated by the federal government for his work and he later testified about the statements at Henry's trial. 72 Henry moved to have his sentence vacated on the ground that the admission of the informant's testimony constituted a violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel. The Court in Henry framed the issue as "whether under the facts of this case a Government agent 'deliberately elicited' incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah." 74 The Court found that the agent's actions violated the framework created in Massiah. 75 The majority held, "By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry 86 The Wilson plurality found that the Sanders "ends ofjustice" framework "provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof" important in an "ends of justice" inquiry. 8 7 Justice Powell emphasized the court of appeals' lack of discussion concerning that court's conclusion that habeas corpus review would serve the "ends ofjustice. ' 88 The plurality concluded that the relevant considerations in a decision to review a successive federal petition for habeas corpus should be more clearly defined. 89 79 373 U.S. 1 (1963). In Sanders, the defendant was arrested and charged with robbing a federally insured bank. Sanders declined counsel, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to jail. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting several errors in the pleading proceeding. The sentencing court denied the petition. Later, Sanders filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus and this time alleged specific facts in support of his claims. The district court denied this motion due to Sanders' failure to allege these specific facts in his first petition. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of Sanders' second habeas corpus petition. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed and ruled that a hearing should have been granted based on the second petition. Id. at 2-23. 80 The Sanders "ends ofjustice" test directed district courts to entertain a successive petition if they determined that such review would serve the "ends ofjustice." Id. at 17. Sanders placed the burden on the prisoner to show that the "ends of justice" would be served by a new hearing. For a discussion of the difference between a "successive petition" and an "abuse of the writ," see Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2622 n.6. Generally, a "successive petition" raises "grounds identical to those raised . . . on a prior petition" while an "abuse of the writ" raises "grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition." Id. at 2622 n.6. Justice Powell reviewed the line of cases interpreting congressional legislation in the area of federal habeas corpus review for persons in state custody. 9 0 The plurality related that, until the 1900's, the Supreme Court limited federal examination of habeas corpus petitions solely to the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdiction. 9 ' The plurality noted that the Court incrementally expanded habeas review to other issues, but maintained that only the jurisdiction of the state court was being questioned. 92 The contention that the Court was only questioning the state court's jurisdiction, the plurality explained, was later abandoned and the broad scope of the writ of habeas corpus was recognized. 93 Justice Powell observed, however, that the trend in federal habeas corpus review has not been one of constant expansion. The plurality concluded that habeas corpus has historically been guided by equitable considerations and available to "persons whom society has grievously wronged." 98 however, that the scope of the habeas corpus writ is not simply a function of the desire "to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error." 9 9 The plurality stated that, instead, the scope of the writ is the product of a "sensitive weighing of the interests implicated."' l0 0 Justice Powell then returned to a consideration of the "ends of justice" standard created in Sanders. Justice Powell noted that the phrase "ends ofjustice" was once part of the statute governing petitions of habeas corpus.' 0 ' Even though the Sanders Court cited this statutory phrase, the plurality found that the Sanders opinion did little to help identify the factors to be considered in an "ends ofjustice" determination.' 0 2 Justice Powell observed that the present statute governing successive habeas corpus petitions no longer contains the "ends ofjustice" language.1 0 3 In interpreting the new legislation, the plurality considered Congress' intent in changing the statute.' 0 4 The plurality found that the legislative history surrounding the changes to the statute suggested that Congress was greatly concerned about the inadequate degree of finality in habeas corpus judgments and the increasing number of state prisoner habeas 99 Id. at 2624. 100 Id. 101 Id. The plurality related:
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both federal and state prisoners, stated in relevant part that no federal judge "shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person... if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined" by a federal court "on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge ... is satisfied that the ends ofjustice will not be served by such inquiry." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964))(emphasis added by Wilson plurality).
102 Id. at 2624. The Sanders Court's failure to be more specific was not an oversight. The Sanders Court concluded, "[T]he test is 'the ends of justice' and it cannot be too finely particularized." Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17. 103 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2624. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1966) states: When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or ajustice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ. 104 The plurality stated, " [W] e are cognizant that Congress adopted the section in light of the need... to weigh the interests of the individual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal laws." Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2625.
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corpus applications filed in the federal courts.' 0 5
The plurality, nevertheless, found that the phrase "ends ofjustice" still provides an adequate framework for federal courts to evaluate successive habeas corpus petitions. 1 0 6 Justice Powell noted that "the permissive language of § 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain successive petitions under some circumstances" but this discretion is to be tempered by Congress' intent to limit such consideration to "rare instances."' 1 0 7 The plurality concluded, therefore, that district courts need specific guidance regarding the application of the "ends of justice" framework.1 0 8
In order to ascertain the applicable standard for an "ends of justice" determination, the plurality examined the interests of society and the prisoner in federal review of a successive habeas petition. 1 0 9 Justice Powell determined that in a successive review, a prisoner's sole interest is his release from custody if he is, in fact, innocent.11 0 Guilty prisoners, Justice Powell reasoned, have no interest in successive review." 1 Justice Powell then focused on the interests of the state and found that the state has a strong interest in finality.1 2 Justice Powell determined that finality in habeas corpus judgments serves many legitimate state interests."1 3 First, Justice Powell found that restrictions on the availability of habeas review serve as a deterrent, 1 1 4 helping to reduce unlawful conduct." 1 5 Second, Justice Powell determined that the state interest in rehabilitation will be furthered by the prisoner's understanding that the determination of his guilt is settled and that he must now accept punishment.1 6 Third, the plurality stated that a federal determination that a prisoner must be retried may be difficult for the state to practically accomplish due to great lapses in time. recall events, destruction of other evidence, etc., will contribute to the difficulty of retrial after great time lapses. Justice Powell observed that the court of appeals ordered a retrial in this case some fourteen years after the murder and robbery were committed. The plurality also briefly mentioned other interests in limiting successive petitions, including reducing the financial resources expended in successive reviews and minimizing the frictions inherent in the federalism relationship. Initially, the majority reviewed the Supreme Court standards for analyzing a claim that the sixth amendment right to counsel has been violated. 128 The majority found that the Massiah line of decisions had its underpinnings in the two concurring opinions from Spano v. New York. 129 Justice Powell noted that "the concurring Justices [in Spano] also took the position that the defendant's right to counsel was violated by the secret interrogation."' ' 30 Justice Powell observed that Justice Stewart had also commented that "an indicted person has the right to assistance of counsel throughout the proceedings against him."'' l These two concurrences, according to Justice Powell, served as the basis for the decision in Massiah v. United States.' 3 2 The Wilson majority asserted that the "deliberately elicited" test of Massiah 133 was designed to prevent both straightforward questioning and "indirect and surreptitious interrogations."' 4 Justice Powell concluded, "Thus, the [Massiah] Court made clear that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative techniques that were equivalent to interrogation, and that it so viewed the technique in issue in Massiah."' 35 The majority then focused on United States v. Henry, 13 6 which applied the "deliberately elicited" test of Massiah to incriminating remarks made to ajailhouse informant. 13 
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Applying this analysis of the sixth amendment line of decisions to the Wilson facts, the majority found no violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. 14 7 The majority, moreover, disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the case did not present the "passive informant" issue. 1 48 The appellate court's mistaken conclusion, according to Justice Powell, stemmed from the appellate court's "failure to accord to the state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correctness expressly required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)."' 4 9 The Court decided that the court of appeals' conclusion concerning the interaction between the informant Lee and the defendant were unsupported by the state court's findings of fact.' 5 0 The majority stated: After thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded that the police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incriminating statements. This conclusion conflicts with the decision of every other state and federal judge who reviewed this record, and is clear error in light of the provisions and intent of § 2254(d).' 5 ' Based upon the factual findings of the trial court and the majority holding that the use of a "passive informant" did not violate the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that the testimony of the informant was admissible into the trial proceedings.' In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct .... 150 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630. The state court findings of fact, noted by Justice Powell, included the careful instructions given by Officer Cullen to Lee, Lee's adherence to those instructions and the existence of other solid evidence against the defendant. The only blemish in the record Justice Powell mentioned was the remark made by Lee to Wilson that his story "didn't sound too good." Id. 151 Id. at 2631 (citation omitted). The court of appeals' belief that "Lee's ongoing verbal intercourse with [Wilson] served to exacerbate [Wilson' s] already troubled state of mind" was determined to be "completely at odds with the facts found by the trial court." Id. 
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VI. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on both the habeas corpus and right to counsel issues. Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's historic understanding of habeas corpus. Justice Brennan asserted that the plurality adopted "a revisionist theory of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence."' 15 3 Moreover, he accused the plurality of implying that federal habeas corpus review may not be available to a prisoner in his first petition as a matter of right, even if the prisoner asserts a violation of a constitutional right. 1 5 4 The dissent further noted the plurality's focus on factual innocence as a cornerstone of habeas corpus review and their subsequent decision that factual innocence is crucial to an "ends of justice" inquiry. 1 5 5 Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality's contention that factual innocence has played an important role in habeas review. 156 He maintained, "Neither the plurality's standard for consideration of successive petitions nor its theory of habeas corpus is supported by statutory language, legislative history, or our precedents." 1 57
Justice Brennan followed with his own historical interpretation of the scope and evolution of habeas corpus. 1 5 8 He contended that habeas corpus review traditionally has not focused on a weighing of prisoner and state interests. 1 59 Justice Brennan identified one area of habeas corpus adjudication where a balancing of state and prisoner interests has occurred-the area of collateral review of claims of constitutional violations procedurally defaulted in state court. 160 In this area of collateral review, Justice Brennan explained, "a state prisoner generally must show cause and actual prejudice."' 16 The ded that the current abuse of habeas corpus writs needs to be impeded. The dissent found statutory support for its argument that federal courts were to be given broad discretion in deciding whether to review habeas corpus petitions.' 6 5 The dissent observed that 28 defendant to show adequate reasons for the defendant's failure to raise the constitutional violation claim in state court while "prejudice" requires the defendant to show some actual harm resulting to the defendant from the admission of the illegally obtained evidence. 
1986] RIGHT TO COUNSEL: JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
U.S.C. § 2244(b) and The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts both contain language granting federal courts considerable discretion to entertain habeas corpus petitions.' 6 6 Furthermore, the dissent found considerable legislative support evidencing Congress' clear intent "that courts continue to determine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear by reference to the Sanders ends of justice standard."' 67 Justice Brennan contended that there was no evidence of a congressional intent to exclude guilty prisoners from obtaining federal habeas review. 168 The dissent, therefore, would have sustained the historical use of the phrase "ends of justice" established by the Sanders Court. 1 69 After asserting that the "ends ofjustice" standard has continuing vitality and that federal courts have been given historical responsibility and statutory discretion to apply this standard, the dissent found that the "respondent alleged a potentially meritorious Sixth Amendment claim."' 70 Justice Brennan reasoned that the decision in United States v. Henry ' 7 ' had clarified the sixth amendment right to counsel analysis applicable to claims similar to Wilson's.' 72 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the court of appeals had not abused its discretion by granting review of the successive habeas corpus petition under this newly clarified legal standard.' A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ. 181 The dissent noted that the informant in Henry did not directly question the accused, but rather engaged the defendant in conversation. 8 2 Justice Brennan cited three other factors that influenced the Henry Court and were critical to its ultimate determination: 1) The informant was compensated for his services on a contingent fee basis and therefore was provided with an incen-tive to obtain results; 8 3 2) Nichols' role as a government informant was not revealed to Henry;1 8 4 and 3) Henry was incarcerated at the time of his conversations with the informant. 90 Unlike the facts in Henry, the dissent in Wilson noted that a visit from the defendant's brother had been a major factor in the decision to confess and confide in the cellmate informant.' 9 '
Justice Brennan found that the brother's visit was not enough to excuse the government-created situation designed to induce incriminating statements. Additionally, Justice Stevens agreed that "a colorable showing of factual innocence" was not crucial to an "ends of justice" scrutiny.' 9 5 Justice Stevens determined that the district court did not "abuse its discretion in entertaining the [habeas corpus] petition in 203 Detective Cullen related the conversation he had with the informant Nichols: I recall telling Nichols at this time to be alert to any statements made by these individuals [the federal prisoners] regarding the charges against them. I specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals about the charges against them, however, if they engaged him in conversation or talked in front of him, he was requested to pay attention to their statements. Hemy, 447 U.S. at 268.
found not to have engaged in direct inquiry but only "had some conversations with Henry. ' 20 4 In Wilson, however, the government more affirmatively assured that a conducive environment for incriminating statements was set. Detective Cullen specifically asked Lee to find out from Wilson the identities of the other two participants in the crime. 20 5 Wilson, moreover, was placed in ajail cell overlooking the scene of his criminal offenses. 20 6 The close visual proximity of the taxi garage forced Wilson to reflect continually on his crimes and the story he gave to the police. Lee's statements to Wilson that Wilson's story "didn't sound too good" and that Wilson should "come up with a better story" 20 7 were clearly intended to elicit responses. If Wilson had broken down at that moment, his statements probably would have been viewed as the product of an intentionally created situation that was likely to induce such statements. Lee's influences should not be overlooked merely because Wilson's confessions were not immediately forthcoming. In Henry, there was no more evidence of the informant directing questions to or eliciting statements from the accused than in Wilson.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Wilson correctly cited the three other factors of thejailhouse informant scheme that were influential in Henry and found these same factors in Wilson. 208 First, there was substantial evidence that Lee was not acting solely out of an interest in the successful prosecution of guilty defendants. Lee testified that he had acted as an informant in approximately 150 other cases and admitted to receiving compensation in every other one of those instances. 20 9 Even if money were not exchanged, similar incentives to produce valuable evidence probably existed. 2 10 State incentives, whether offers of financial renumeration or improvements in prisoner treatment, could induce an informant to distort his recall of his jail cell actions and conversations at a later trial. Second, the choice not to reveal Lee's identity as an agent of the government resulted in disclosures "that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be Government agents." 2 1 ' In a situation where Wilson was unaware that Lee was a government agent, Wilson could not have effectively waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Third, Wilson, similar to Henry, was in custody at the time of the alleged elicitation. Wilson, moreover, occupied the cell with only one other prisoner, Lee. 2 12 Lee had ample opportunity to develop cellmate camaraderie, to share "a common plight," and to capitalize on those "pressures" and "subtle influences" that confinement under hostile conditions creates. 2 13 Lee had a better opportunity to gain the confidence of the accused than did the informant in Henry.
If the jailhouse informant analysis of Henry was applied properly, then the informant practices in Wilson would have been held unconstitutional under the sixth amendment. Some might argue, however, that the Henry framework overprotects an accused's sixth amendment rights. The considerations deemed important by the Henry Court, however, are crucial to sixth amendment protection. Since Powell v. Alabama, 21 4 our judicial system has recognized that a criminal defendant is often unable to properly protect his interests against the powerful forces of the state, and resist the "nudges" 2 15 that may result in a suspect taking actions that are not in his selfinterest. Interrogation acts as a "nudge" by encouraging suspects to make damaging disclosures. The Massiah Court, moreover, recognized that leading questions by a criminal cohort could serve as a very effective "nudge." 2 16 It is an unacceptable intrusion on a criminal defendant's right to counsel for the state to provide incentives for the cohort to induce or "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements and thereafter utilize such statements in prosecuting the criminal defendant.
Given an appropriate incentive, ajailhouse informant, even one that does not participate in explicit interrogation, can act as an equally effective "nudge." Once compensation is offered, the informant becomes an active agent of the government. The informant can begin fostering a deceptive relationship with the accused. The informant's ultimate goal is to gain the defendant's trust and obtain damaging confessions. In his pursuit of the defendant's confidence, two factors aid the informant. First, the defendant and informant will be spending a great deal of time together and presumably will grow familiar with one another. The informant can shape that familiarity into trust. Second, the defendant and informant share an apparent mutual adversary, the police power of the state. 21 7 Confrontations with this mutual enemy will also help bring the pair closer together and further encourage the defendant to make incriminating confidential disclosures.
The accused's responses to an informant's direct questions regarding the accused's crimes, however, are not admissible under current law. 2 18 Incriminating disclosures, nevertheless, can be induced indirectly by other means. The informant, for example, may be permitted to ask questions about the defendant's prior dealings with the police, his need or desire for money, his familiarity with weapons, or his hopes for support from family and friends. The informant may even succeed in asking direct questions concerning the crimes committed. In Wilson's case, only the informant and Detective Cullen testified about what went on in the defendant's jail cell. 2 19 In testimony at trial, an informant may distort the nature of the questions posed to the accused and the accused's responses to serve the informant's own interests. A court could have a difficult time determining the veracity of the informant's statements.
The Henry decision recognized the potential for extensive jailhouse informant abuses. As a result, the Henry Court isolated three preconditions which often lead to informant abuses. 220 First, the informant needs an incentive such as a contingent fee. Without any such consideration, the potential for mischaracterizations or abuses by the informant is diminished. Second, confinement over a significant period of time is necessary to develop camaraderie between the accused and the informant. If there is no confinement, the suspect is not subject to the intense need for association and support from fellow inmates. Third, the agent's true role must remain undisclosed to the accused. If the defendant knows he is facing a govern- 217 The term "apparent" is used here to contemplate those instances where the "cellmate" is, in fact, an undercover policeman or detective and not a criminal suspect. ment agent he can properly guard his disclosures. Without such knowledge, the defendant is unaware of the imminent peril. He cannot exercise his right to summon his attorney and cannot voluntarily and intelligently waive that right. Abuse of one condition may not be considered an obtrusive violation by the state. All three preconditions together pose an effective device for extracting information from the accused and, therefore, unjustifiably circumvent the right to counsel.
The Wilson decision was not an unexpected reversal in the Supreme Court's right to counsel philosophy. In fact, some commentators expected this reversal in sixth amendment philosophy to occur in Henry. In reporting the Supreme Court's decision in Henry, one commentator remarked, "The [C]ourt's reasoning was so unexpected that there had even been predictions it might use the Henry case to reverse the Massiah ruling and to throw out the limited protections against the use of informants that the Warren [C]ourt had established." 22 ' Given the recency of Henry and Moulton 22 2 and these decisions' affirmation of Massiah's continued viability, 22 3 sixth amendment protections should continue to evolve within the "deliberately elicited" framework. The Wilson Court's failure to apply the standards developed in Henry, however, raises serious questions as to the Henry framework's continued viability. Instead of focusing on the "situation" created by the state, the Wilson Court focused solely on the informant's actions and his attempts to "stimulate" conversation and prompt incriminating remarks. 2 24 Wilson has, therefore, narrowed the scope of inquiry regarding the use of an informant. The Wilson decision urges lower courts to review defendant/informant dialogue rather than to examine the state-created circumstances in their entirety. In the future, agents of the state, whether or not their identities are revealed to the defendant, still cannot ask direct questions bearing on the crime. Particularly egregious informant coercions, in addition, will not receive court approval. and confess" will not receive court approval.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to explore how state deployment ofjailhouse informants is likely to change as a result of Wilson. The use ofjailhouse informants should increase as a direct result of Wilson. Similarly, the sixth amendment right to counsel protection, which is an essential element of our system of justice, will be diminished.
Police authorities can play a large, and apparently acceptable, role in the informant's activities. Compensation for an informant's results seems acceptable under Wilson. More cautious authorities can establish a more secretive, less tangible system of rewards. Such a system could include a more sympathetic prosecutorial stance, small favors such as extra visitor time or better food, and generally better treatment. The police can assist the informant in developing and sponsoring cellmate camaraderie. Arrangements could be made to keep the the defendant and informant together in as many prison activities as possible, or to treat the pair as if the state planned to prosecute their criminal misdeeds in a similar fashion. The increased use of informants might even induce the police to treat the defendant more harshly. Verbal and physical abuse will amplify the already uncomfortable prison experience and provide a reason for camaraderie to flourish.
The state, moreover, will now be more anxious as a result of Wilson to indict criminal suspects and incarcerate them quickly and for as long a period as possible. Counsel for the accused would be well-advised to provide for the expeditious release of their clients from a potentially damaging deception and should further discourage clients from trusting and confiding in fellow prisoners.
B. SUCCESSIVE FEDERAL PETITIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
The plurality in Kuhlmann v. Wilson failed to weigh accurately the interests of the prisoner and the state in successive petitions for federal habeas corpus and created a standard with a number of inherent shortcomings. The plurality devised a solution to a problem which they failed, initially, to identify as a legitimate dilemma. Justice Powell contended, "Failure to provide clear guidance leaves districtjudges 'at large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus,' creating the danger that they will engage in 'the exercise not of law but of arbitrariness.' "226 The plurality, however, did not demonstrate that federal courts have acted arbitrarily in their deci- sions to entertain successive habeas petitions. 22 7 The Court should identify a flaw in our judicial system before contemplating any legitimate alternative.
While the dissent identified an area of constitutional concern that has been balanced against the interests of the state, 228 any invasion into a constitutional right should be met with meticulous scrutiny. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell, 229 where the Court arguably permitted a balancing of interests in fourth amendment claims,230 the Court cautioned, "Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally." 23 1 In contrast, the Wilson plurality contended, " [T] he Court has performed its statutory task [defining the scope of the writ] through a sensitive weighing of the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitutional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the state courts." 2 32 The plurality referred to one authority to support the proposition that state and prisoner interests are to be weighed in a habeas determination. 23 3 This authority actually asserted, "Its [the habeas writ's] root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release." 2 34 The plurality failed to offer convincing support for its proposition that the interests of the prisoner should be subject to any balancing against the interests of the state. Any attempt, therefore, by the Wilson Court to balance state and prisoner interests should be approached with great skepticism.
Even if a balancing of state and prisoner interests can be accepted as a legitimate judicial function in the context of habeas corpus writs, careful attention must be given to the importance of 227 The plurality pointed out that the number of habeas corpus applications filed in federal courts has grown but did not establish that this had led to arbitrary entertainment of these applications. See id. at 2625 n.12. Despite the plurality's criticism of the Sanders Court's indefiniteness, the plurality failed to recognize Sanders' unqualified advice that a state's interest in finality was not to be considered in a habeas corpus determination. Assuming, however, that finality can be considered in a weighing of interests, further examination must be given to the interests purportedly served by finality. The state has a legitimate interest in controlling the costs associated with successive appeals and subsequent retrials. 23 8 The state, in addition, has a legitimate concern that any retrial ordered may be virtually impossible to orchestrate. 23 9 There are, however, a number of state interests noted by the plurality that cannot survive close scrutiny. The state's interest in deterrence will not be served by a more rigorous standard for successive habeas corpus petitions. It is inconceivable that ajealous husband considering striking a discovered adulteress or a hungry indigent considering robbing a liquor store would contemplate the probability that their successive habeas corpus writ would be reviewed. Considering, moreover, the skepticism that prisons foster rehabilitation, 240 the state's purported interest in rehabilitation is not convincing. 24 '
In response to a perceived need to balance the interests implicated, the plurality adopted the "colorable showing of factual innocence" standard. This standard had not been adopted by any other federal tribunal and had no statutory support, but was the product of a law review article written by Judge Friendly over fifteen years ago. 24 2 The standard requires the prisoner to show a fair probability in light of all of the evidence, including that which was allegedly improperly admitted, that the trier of fact would have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 24 3 Although the "fair probability" test gives district courts a more objective standard to apply, it will not serve the courts' interest in expediting overcrowded dockets. As the dissent noted, a district court will have to review each petition carefully and act as a rough equivalent to a trier of fact. 24 4 The substantial time required to review lengthy records and make such decisions will effectively negate the rewards expected by adopting the standard. The growing number of petitions the plurality found as increasingly burdensome on the federal judicial system 2 45 will not necessarily decrease as a result of the "colorable showing of factual innocence" framework. Judge Friendly admitted:
Aside from the most drastic measures, changes that would narrow the grounds available for collateral attack would not necessarily discourage prisoners from trying; they have everything to gain and nothing to lose. Indeed, collateral attack may have become so much a way of prison life as to have created its own self-generating force: it may now be considered merely something done as a matter of course during long incarceration. Today's growing number of prisoner petitions despite the minute percentage granted points that way.
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The standard, moreover, will not cover all habeas corpus possibilities. Applications for writs of habeas corpus that cite state court errors at the sentencing stage of the trial proceedings cannot use a standard hinged on a showing of innocence. 24 7 Since the defendant's guilt has been affirmatively established before the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding, a requirement of "a colorable showing of factual innocence" is meaningless in that context. If district court difficulties in applying a discretionary standard do indeed exist, the Supreme Court will be forced to create another standard to cover these instances as well.
The plurality, in adopting Judge Friendly's standard of "a colorable showing of factual innocence," neglected to observe that Judge Friendly would not require such a showing in a sixth amendment right to counsel dispute. Judge Friendly explained:
Still, in these cases where the attack concerns the very basis of the criminal process, few would object to allowing collateral attack regardless of the defendant's probable guilt. These cases would include all those in which the defendant claims he was without counsel to whom he was constitutionally entitled .... For, as Justice Schaefer of Illinois has so wisely said, "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." '248 Under the framework proposed by Judge Friendly, Wilson would not be required to make "a colorable showing of factual innocence" but need only assert that the "criminal process itself ha[d] broken down."
' 24 9 Claims of sixth amendment right to counsel violations, furthermore, are not the only area of habeas review where Judge Friendly found that an examination of the prisoner's claim is justified irrespective of any issue of innocence. 250 The plurality, however, did not identify any area of constitutional law where the "colorable showing of factual innocence" framework would not apply. The plurality, instead, adopted the problematic "colorable showing of factual innocence" standard based upon an ill-advised weighing of prisoner and state interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Determining the scope of a suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel is, admittedly, a difficult area of constitutional adjudication. The interest in criminal justice and the successful investigation and prosecution of persons who pose a "dangerous threat to those unidentified and innocent people who will be the victims of crime today and tomorrow" 25 1 is undoubtedly compelling. It is important, therefore, that courts encourage and support emerging developments in police investigation. It is also important, however, that they carefully consider the Supreme Court's warning in the early decision of Spano v. New York: "But as law enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to extract confes- 1, 8 (1956) ). 249 Friendly, supra note 118, at 151. 250 Judge Friendly cited three additional areas in which collateral attack in his imaginary unitary system would be legitimate despite doubts over the defendant's innocence. These areas included: 1) where a violation of constitutional rights is asserted on the basis of facts foreign to the trial record and not considered by the reviewing tribunal; 2) where the state "failed to provide proper procedure for making a defense at trial and on appeal"; and 3) where the alleged violation concerns an area of modern constitutional developments bearing on criminal procedures. Friendly, supra note 118, at 152-53. 251 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
sions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more delicate judgments to be made. ' 2 52 In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, the United States Supreme Court turned its back on that "duty" and ignored the import of the right to counsel line of decisions. The majority essentially overlooked the well-considered informant framework developed in Henry. Instead of focusing on the actions of the state in their entirety, the majority limited its scrutiny to the actions of the jailhouse informant. The Court, in so doing, laid the groundwork for a future of unsettling and unacceptable violations of incarcerated suspects' constitutional rights. The "colorable showing of factual innocence" framework created by the plurality for review of successive federal petitions of habeas corpus was grounded upon weak precedential underpinnings and a number of questionable Supreme Court assumptions. Much of the standard's utility, moreover, is dependent upon the ability of lower courts to effectively apply the test. In that respect, the framework has several inherent shortcomings to overcome.
